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The Role of International 
Organizations in the 
Development of International 
Environmental Law: Adjusting 
the Lenses of Analysis 
Rita Guerreiro Teixeira* 
Abstract 
International organizations have gradually moved beyond 
constituting mere fora for negotiations between states and have 
assumed a more active role in law-making. In the environmental field, 
international organizations engage in a variety of functions. For 
example, the UN has convened the Global Conferences, leading to the 
adoption of foundational declarations of principles, and numerous other 
international organizations have prepared draft texts, promoted the 
conclusion of environmental agreements, adopted standards, guidelines 
and recommendations, and prepared influential studies. Additionally, 
novel institutional arrangements have been established by multilateral 
environmental agreements, which often include a Conference of the 
Parties empowered to develop the treaty obligations through innovative 
legislative processes which do not always require consent by all state 
parties.  
While these various instruments have influenced the development 
of international environmental norms, the extent and the processes 
through which they have done so remain unaccounted for. This article 
argues that the traditional account of the sources of international law, 
reliant on the triad of formal sources in Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, and the strict division between hard 
and soft law, which still dominates the mainstream discourse, is unable 
to fully grasp the nature of institutional law-making. This is 
particularly relevant in the environmental field, where scientific 
uncertainties and states’ frequent unwillingness to commit to far-
reaching (often high cost) solutions make the negotiation of traditional 
international treaties and the development of customary rules more 
challenging and have led to the development of novel and dynamic law-
making processes, often led by international organizations. 
Additionally, it contends that the first step to develop an all-
encompassing account of the role of international organizations in the 
development of environmental law is to abandon the a priori labelling 
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of instruments into the categories of binding or nonbinding (or hard 
versus soft law), which only considers their immediate intended effects 
and predetermines the result of any analysis into their broader law-
making characteristics. Instead, it proposes that it is necessary to ignore 
the strict binary law versus non-law when conducting research into the 
normative outputs of international organizations, allowing for the 
collection and analysis of the broadest variety of instruments and their 
individual characteristics.  
The article concludes that only through such research can new ways 
of categorizing the “infinite variety” of instruments of international 
organizations be proposed and international lawyers can start 
developing the new analytical tools they need to advance the study of 
institutional law-making today. 
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1. Introduction 
International organizations have had a significant role in the 
development of international environmental law. They are present in 
every step of norm development—they set the agenda for international 
negotiations, prepare draft conventions, adopt guidelines and codes of 
conduct, directly alter the content of—or develop—treaty obligations, 
and adopt compliance regimes.1 Furthermore, novel institutional 
 
1. See generally Daniel Bodansky et al., International Environmental Law: 
Mapping the Field, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ENV’T L. 1, 17–
19 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2008); Gerhard Loibl, The Role of 
International Organisations in International Law-Making International 
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arrangements have been established by multilateral environmental 
agreements (“MEAs”), which often include a Conference of the Parties 
(“COP”) empowered to develop the treaty obligations through 
innovative legislative processes that do not always require consent by 
all state parties.2  
However, the theory of international law-making has largely failed 
to catch-up with developments in practice. International lawyers 
attempting to capture the normative output of international 
organizations in their entirety have long struggled with the shackles of 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) and the triad of formal sources of international law. This 
difficulty has only grown because of the expanding role that 
international organizations play in fields such as environmental 
protection and the variety of instruments they adopt. As a result, a 
relevant part of the instruments of international organizations remains 
understudied regarding their characteristics and effects—and most of 
them have been relegated to the category of “soft law,” a concept that 
is widely underexplained and, as such, remains limited in its usefulness.  
This article deals with these challenges and proposes a framework 
to move the debate forward. Part 2 provides a brief overview of the 
different roles that international organizations have played in the 
development of international environmental law. Part 3 discusses the 
relation between the normative instruments of international 
organizations in this field and the formal sources of international law, 
concluding that this relation is insufficient to explain the impact of 
those instruments in law-making processes. Accordingly, I argue that 
the formalist account of the sources of international law and the strict 
division between hard and soft law, which still dominates the 
mainstream discourse, is unable to fully grasp the nature of institutional 
law-making as it stands today.  
Finally, Part 4 sets some guidelines for future research in the field. 
It proposes that an all-encompassing analysis of the practice of different 
organizations operating in the environmental field should guide future 
developments in theory and we should set aside the a priori distinction 
between binding and nonbinding instruments. This is the first step in 
developing a new language and new analytical tools that will allow for 
a better discussion of the variety of normative outputs of international 
organizations. 
 
Environmental Negotiations – an Empirical Study, 1 NON-STATE 
ACTORS & IN’TL L. 41, 43 (2001); Julia Sommer, Environmental Law-
Making by International Organizations, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 628 
(1996).  
2. See Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 19. 
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2. International organizations as actors in the 
development of international environmental law 
Nearly all international organizations today have included issues of 
environmental protection and sustainable development in their work 
programs, contributing to a complex and diverse scheme of global 
environmental governance.3 The United Nations (“UN”) has been 
occupied with environmental concerns since the 1960s, although 
notably, no reference to the environment can be found in the UN 
Charter.4 It was the UN that convened the Global Conferences in 
Stockholm and Rio, as well as the Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
leading to the negotiation and adoption of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),5 the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (“Biodiversity Convention”),6 and the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).7 The UN General 
Assembly established the UN Environmental Programme (“UNEP”) in 
1972 and the Commission on Sustainable Development (“CSD”) in 
1992.8 These bodies, having mostly recommendatory powers, have 
played a significant role in environmental governance.9 Several 
environmental conventions such as the Convention on Migratory 
Species,10 the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer,11 the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes (“Basel Convention”),12 and the Biodiversity 
Convention were concluded under the auspices of the UNEP, following 
 
3. Loibl, supra note 1. 
4. See generally U.N. Charter. It is now largely uncontroversial that those 
powers can be implied from the UN broad mandate of furtherance of 
international cooperation in solving economic and social problems. See 
PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
58–59 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2009). 
5. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
6. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397. 
8. G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) (Dec. 15, 1972); G.A. Res. 47/191 (Dec. 22, 
1992). 
9. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/191 (Jan. 29, 1993). 
10. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 
June 23, 1979, 1651 U.N.T.S. 333. 
11. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 
1513 U.N.T.S. 293. 
12. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57. 
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the priorities set out in its 1982 and 1993 Montevideo Programmes.13 
Furthermore, the UNEP developed several principles, guidelines, and 
standards on conservation and use of shared national resources, marine 
environment protection, hazardous waste management, environmental 
impact assessment, and others,14 including the Cairo Guidelines and 
Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous 
Waste15 and the UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact 
Assessment.16 The CSD, in turn, is primarily responsible for reviewing 
the implementation of Agenda 21, having a broad list of monitoring, 
review, and recommendatory tasks.17 It meets annually and provides a 
diplomatic forum for continued negotiations concerning sustainable 
development.18 It has mostly approved political recommendations.19 
Additionally, the International Law Commission (“ILC”), a subsidiary 
body of the UN General Assembly, has conducted relevant work on the 
codification of the law relating to international watercourses and the 
prevention of transboundary harm and, more recently, environmental 
protection during armed conflict and protection of the atmosphere.20 
 
13. U.N. Env’t Programme, Montevideo Programme for the Development and 
Periodic Review on Environmental Law, Decision 10/21 of the Governing 
Council of UNEP (May 31, 1982); U.N. Env’t Programme, Programme 
for the Development and Periodic Review on Environmental Law for the 
1990s (June 1993). 
14. See generally BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 68; Loibl, supra note 1, at 
60–63. 
15. U.N. Env’t Programme, Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the 
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, 
UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex II (1987). 
16. U.N. Env’t Programme, Environmental Impact Assessment, 
UNEP/GC/DEC/14/25 (June 17, 1987). 
17. G.A. Res. 47/191, supra note 9, ¶ 4(c). 
18. See id. ¶ 9. 
19. See generally id. ¶ 14(c). 
20. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Sixth Session, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and 
Resolution on Transboundary Confined Groundwater, 49 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1997] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1; Int’l Law Comm’n 
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001); Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventieth Session, Protection of the 
Atmosphere, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.909 (June 6, 2018); Int’l Law Comm’n, 
Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-First Session, Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.937 
(June 6, 2019). 
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UN specialized agencies have also assumed responsibilities for 
environmental protection; most have developed their powers in this 
field through broad interpretations of their constitutive treaties and 
practice.21 These include the International Maritime Organization 
(“IMO”), the Food and Agricultural Organization (“FAO”), the World 
Bank, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the 
UN Industrial Development Organization (“UNIDO”), and the 
International Fund for Agriculture.  
Other international organizations, which mainly operate in different 
fields, also engage with the environment—such as the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).22 Finally, most regional 
organizations also act on environmental matters—in Europe, the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”), the Council of Europe, 
the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (“OSCE”), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(“NATO”) have all acted in the field.23 
These organizations have been undertaking a range of law-making 
activities.24 They have promoted the negotiation of environmental 
conventions—IMO developed conventions related to pollution from 
vessels, including the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”)25 and the Convention for the 
Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments;26 
FAO developed the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture27 and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
 
21. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 59. 
22. See Francesca Romanin Jacur, The Making of International 
Environmental Law, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRAC. 
OF INT’L LAWMAKING 419, 419 (Catherine Brölmann & Yannick Radi 
eds., 2016). 
23. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 72–73, for the role of UNECE in 
developing regional environmental law. 
24. See id. at 71–84. 
25. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 
2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184. 
26. International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ 
Ballast Water and Sediments, Adoption of the Final Act and Any 
Instruments, Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting from the Work 
of the Conference U.N. Doc BWM/CONF/36 (Feb. 16, 2004). 
27. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303. 
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Pesticides in International Trade (“PIC Convention”),28 the latter 
together with UNEP. They have established new bodies and 
institutions—together FAO, the International Labour Organization 
(“ILO”), UNIDO, the World Health Organization (“WHO”), UNEP 
and OECD established the Inter-Organization Programme for the 
Sound Management of Chemicals through a memorandum of 
understanding.29 They established implementation mechanisms—the 
World Bank cooperates in the implementation of MEA based regimes 
through a variety of funding schemes and acts as a trustee for the 
Global Environment Facility (“GEF”), an institution established 
jointly by the World Bank, UNEP, and the UN Development Program 
with the objective of facilitating the transfer of funds and technology 
from developed to developing states to help the latter meet the 
incremental costs of implementing environmental measures.30 They 
provide expert advice and technical consultations for international 
negotiations—FAO provided expert and influential advice, for instance, 
in the negotiation of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of 
the Living Resources of the High Seas,31 the UNCLOS, and the 1995 
Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks;32 the 
WTO and UNEP published a joint report addressing the linkages 
between trade and climate change, introducing new concepts at a 
critical time of negotiations over a post-Kyoto climate change treaty.33 
 
28. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 
10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337. 
29. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Establishment of the Inter-
Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals, 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (1994), 
https://www.who.int/iomc/participants/iomc-mou.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VRS-YNMY]. 
30. Global Environment Facility [GEF], Instrument for the Establishment of 
the Restructured Global Environment Facility, (September 2019), 
https://www.thegef.org/documents/instrument-establishment-
restructured-gef. 
31. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. 
32. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3; BIRNIE ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 74. 
33. World Trade Org. & U.N. Env’t Programme, Trade and Climate Change 
(2009); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World of International 
Regulatory Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 284 (2015). 
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Finally, these international organizations play an important role in 
international standard setting.34 The wide range of instruments they 
have adopted in this context include the Codex Alimentarius—a set of 
food standards, guidelines and codes of practice aimed at contributing 
to the safety, quality, and fairness of international food trade adopted 
by the WHO and FAO—35 the annexes on ship safety and pollution 
adopted by the IMO36 the CO2 emission standards for air transport 
adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization37 and the 
WHO standards on air quality.38 
In addition to these, MEAs established a great number of 
institutional arrangements;  most MEAs are designed as framework 
conventions, laying down only general obligations and establishing their 
own institutional structures with powers to develop and specify the 
obligations contained in the treaty.39 They usually set up a permanent 
plenary organ, known as COP, and auxiliary organs (such as 
secretariats, financial mechanisms, and subsidiary technical organs, 
advising on scientific, legal, and economic aspects).40 COPs are 
normally tasked with adopting concrete measures necessary for 
implementing the broad objectives set out in MEAs, often through the 
adoption of amendments and protocols (which are generally 
subsequently ratified by the parties), development and amendment of 
(binding) technical annexes, and elaboration and adoption of 
nonbinding guidelines and recommendations that are needed to make 
key provisions of the agreement operational.41 
An example of this institutional dynamic is found in the COP to 
the UNFCCC, which is entrusted with regularly reviewing the 
implementation of the obligations under the convention and related 
instruments, making the decisions necessary to promote its effective 
implementation, adopting regular reports, and making 
recommendations.42 Furthermore, it can adopt amendments to the 
convention by a three-fourths majority vote of the parties present and 
 
34. Paolo Contini & Peter H. Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment 
Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 37, 40 (1972).  
35. Id. at 44. 
36. Id. at 43. 
38. Id. at 42; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 74–75. 
38. Contini & Sand, supra note 34, at 42. 
39. See generally Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (2002). 
40. See id. at 4.  
41. Romanin Jacur, supra note 22, at 422. See Brunnée, supra note 39, at 17–
32. 
42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 
5, at art. 7(1). 
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voting if no consensus can be reached.43 Importantly, the COP to the 
UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, regulating greenhouse 
gases emissions and establishing a new institutional structure, the 
Meeting of the Parties (“MOP”) to the Kyoto Protocol.44 Similarly, the 
COP to the Biodiversity Convention is empowered to adopt protocols 
and amendments to the convention and its annexes, create subsidiary 
bodies deemed necessary to implement the convention, and establish 
appropriate forms of cooperation with bodies from other conventions.45 
Amendments to the Biodiversity Convention are adopted by unanimity 
or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority vote of the parties present and 
voting at the meeting, and shall be submitted to the parties for 
ratification, acceptance or approval.46 In 2000, the COP adopted the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which deals with the handling, 
transport and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern 
biotechnology.47 In 2010 the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization was adopted.48  
In some other cases, however, MEAs and their protocols established 
innovative approaches to amendment procedures, in which changes can 
enter into force without consent from all state parties, making them 
more expedited.49 An example can be found with the powers conferred 
to the MOP of the Montreal Protocol of Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, which can adopt amendments to the annexes to the 
protocol, adding or removing substances, and decide on the 
mechanisms, scope and timing of control measures.50 These decisions of 
the MOP are taken by consensus or, if that fails, by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the parties present and voting and they are binding on 
 
43. Id. at art. 15(3). 
44. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
45. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 23. 
46. Id. at art. 29(3). 
47. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208. 
48. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, U.N.T.C. Registration 
No. 30619. 
49. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 138–39 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2003). 
50. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 at art. 2(10). 
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all parties,51 unless they notify an objection to the depository within six 
months of approval.52 A similar procedure is provided for the 
amendment of the annexes of a “scientific, technical, procedural or 
administrative character” to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.53 
The MOP to the Montreal Protocol can, however, also adopt 
adjustments to the ozone depleting potentials of the substances already 
listed in the annexes and to their phase-out schedules with a qualified 
majority involving both developed and developing states. These enter 
into force for all state parties, without any possibility to opt out.54 This 
type of expedited amendment procedure is justified by the need to 
quickly update environmental treaties to incorporate technical and 
scientific developments, as well as changes of economic and political 
nature.55 Furthermore, this normative setting provides for a dynamic 
and iterative process for the development of international 
environmental legislation, where scientific and technical expertise play 
a significant role.56 In fact, MEAs often create scientific or technical 
bodies (usually subsidiary bodies to the COPs) and rely upon the work 
of independent advisory bodies as well as integrate scientific 
information into law-making and compliance processes.57 
These developments in normative processes inside international 
organizations are increasingly at odds with a traditional account of 
international law-making, still dependent on state consent and where 
the international organizations have little autonomy from their 
members.58 Additionally, as international organizations are drafting the 
texts of environmental treaties, adopting standards and guidelines that 
effectively regulate areas of practice, and developing treaty obligations, 
in some cases dispensing with the need for state consent, it becomes 
increasingly challenging to explain the making of international 
environmental law through the lenses of formalism and the exclusivity 
 
51. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 11, 
at arts. 9(4) and 10(2). 
52. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra 
note 50, at art. 10(2). 
53. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 44, at art. 21; United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 5, at art. 16(1-4). 
54. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra 
note 50, at art. 2(9)(d). 
55. Romanin Jacur, supra note 22, at 424; SANDS, supra note 49, at 138. 
56. See generally Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 18–20.  
57. Jutta Brunnée, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law: 
Environment, Multilateral Agreements ¶¶ 38–40 (Oxford University 
Press Jan. 2011). 
58. See Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 21–22. 
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of the formal sources of international law. The next section deals with 
these challenges.  
3. The insufficiency of the formal sources of 
international law 
The capacity to develop international norms is often mentioned as 
one of constitutive elements of international organizations and one the 
reasons states decide to cooperate through these institutions.59 
However, the exact terms and scope of their contribution to 
international law-making are far from clear.  
Traditionally, all norms of international law derive from one of the 
formal sources listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ: treaties, 
custom and general principles of law.60 Notably, instruments of 
international organizations are absent from this list, which has posed a 
challenge to the many authors trying to capture their normative 
relevance.61 In most cases international organizations are only 
empowered to make recommendations to their member states (in the 
form of resolutions, declarations, or guidelines); while the power to 
adopt binding acts is only exceptionally granted.62 Having noted this, 
international lawyers found refuge in the category of “soft law” to 
describe the majority of their normative instruments.63  
Despite there being no consensus on the concept, a relatively 
uncontroversial definition of soft law is a set of non-binding instruments 
containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected 
 
59. NIELS M. BLOKKER & HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY § 1216 (Nijhoff 5th rev. 
ed. 2011); PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 267 (Sweet & Maxwell 6th ed. 2009); Kenneth W. Abbott 
& Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 15 (1998). 
60. See generally NIGEL WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 159 (Manchester Univ. Press 2005). 
61. Cf. a short overview of these attempts in Jan Klabbers, The Normative 
Gap in International Organizations Law: The Case of the World Health 
Organization, 16 INT. ORGAN. LAW. REV. 272, 273 (2019). 
62. Cf. Ian Johnstone, Law-Making by International Organizations, in 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 266, 272 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
Pollack eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); see Ellen Hey, International 
Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ENV’T L. 750, 755 
(Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).  
63. See Catherine Redgwell, Sources of International Environmental Law: 
Formality and Informality in the Dynamic Evolution of International 
Environmental Law Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE 
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 955 (Samantha Besson & Jean 
d’Aspremont eds., 2017). 
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behavior.64 Several authors agree that, although these commitments 
cannot be forcibly enforced, they still give rise to some level of 
compliance expectation.65  
With respect to international environmental law, it is suggested 
that it is a “particularly fertile area for soft law norms,” where they 
permit reaching agreements on international action in areas where 
scientific uncertainties make it difficult for states to agree on binding 
long-term agreements.66 To justify the legal relevance of these 
instruments, albeit their non-binding character, several authors argue 
that they can give rise to legal obligations in certain situations—i.e., 
become hard law—through a relation with one of the formal sources of 
international law.67 For example: (i) the drafts of the UNFCCC and the 
Biodiversity Convention, prepared under UN auspices, acquired legal 
force when they were signed as treaties by states; (ii) the adoption of 
the Stockholm Declaration contributed to the codification of the duty 
to prevent transboundary harm as a rule of customary international 
law; and (iii) the inclusion of the common but differentiated 
responsibilities and the polluter-pays principles in the Rio Declaration 
 
64. Dinah Shelton, International Law and “Relative Normativity,” in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 159 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 4th ed. 2014); see WHITE, supra note 60. Some authors use the term 
soft law to refer to rules that are included in binding legal instruments 
but are imprecise in their terms, rendering them non-justiciable and not-
enforceable – see, most notably, Prosper Weil, Towards Relative 
Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414 (1983). 
This is not the use of the term that is considered in this article. 
65. Thirlway provides a working definition of soft law, according to which it 
is “a system of international commitments or obligations that are not 
regarded by those concerned as binding in the sense that can be enforced 
in the same way, as those imposed by international law proper but yet 
are considered as something more than mere political gestures, so that 
there is an expectation of compliance even if there is no legal duty.” HUGH 
THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 188–89 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2019). See also Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International 
Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 118, 120–21 (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 5th ed. 2018); Shelton, supra note 64, at 160; 
BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34. 
66. Redgwell, supra note 63, at 956; see also Jutta Brunnée, Sources of 
International Environmental Law: Interactional Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 960, 978–79 
(Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont eds., Oxford University Press 
2017); BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–36. 
67. See, e.g., THIRLWAY, supra note 65, at 192–94; Boyle, supra note 65, at 
120–21; Redgwell, supra note 63, at 955–56; Shelton, supra note 64, at 
161; ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 214–29 (2017).  
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contributed to their emergence as general principles of law.68 However, 
this is only part of the story of how these instruments impact the 
development of international environmental law.  
3.1. Treaties and treaty instruments 
Treaties are the most common instrument through which generally 
applicable rules of environmental law have been developed.69 The 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,70 the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora,71 the UNCLOS,72 the Basel Convention,73 the 
UNFCCC,74 and the Biodiversity Convention75 are some examples of 
the numerous MEAs concluded during the past few decades.  
While the conclusion of treaties remains, largely, the domain of 
states, under certain circumstances international organizations can 
intervene in the process. In some cases, the constitutive instrument of 
an organization explicitly provides for the power to prepare and adopt 
drafts of conventions to be later signed by member states. This is the 
case of the IMO, which, under the powers conferred by Article 2 of the 
IMO Convention,76 has adopted several conventions related to the 
prevention of marine pollution, among them MARPOL.77 
In other cases, the preparation of draft conventions and the 
convening of international conferences has become the practice of an 
organization. The most evident example of this is the practice of the 
 
68. See Boyle, supra note 65, at 120–21; Redgwell, supra note 63, at 955–56; 
Shelton, supra note 64, at 159–160. 
69. See Redgwell, supra note 63, at 944; Brunnée, supra note 66, at 968; 
SANDS, supra note 49, at 126. 
70. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 
U.N.T.S 72. 
71. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
72. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7. 
73. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, supra note 12. 
74. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 
5. 
75. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6. 
76. Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Mar. 17, 1958, 
289 U.N.T.S. 1, art. 3. Later renumbered according with the amendment 
of 1977. Amendments to the title and substantive provisions of the 
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Nov. 9, 1977, 
1285 U.N.T.S. 318. 
77. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
supra note 25. 
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UN itself, which has convened the Global Conferences on the 
Environment and was involved in the preparation of draft texts for the 
UNFCCC, the Biodiversity Convention on, and the PIC Convention 
(together with FAO), to name just a few.78 Finally, it has been common 
for environmental treaties to incorporate the content of previous 
guidelines or standards drafted by international organizations—for 
instance, the UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact 
Assessment were substantially incorporated in the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context79 and 
the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound 
Management of Hazardous Waste provided the basis for negotiations of 
the Basel Convention.80 
These practices do not raise any problems under a formalistic 
account of sources of international law—it has long been recognized 
that drafts prepared by international organizations can be incorporated 
into international negotiations and lead to the conclusion of a treaty, 
thus conferring binding force to the text.81 However, the specific 
scientific and political constraints that characterize the environmental 
field have led to the development of new, more flexible processes for 
treaty-making and treaty-adaptation, which are led by international 
organizations and challenge the traditional account of sources as 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Some of these constraints arise from heavily relying on scientific 
assessments to identify both environmental problems and effective 
solutions. These assessments are often unclear about the causes of the 
problems and the best approaches change over time as science and the 
environment quickly evolve.82 In addition, while environmental 
challenges are diverse among themselves, often involving different 
policy areas and divergent interests, they are closely interconnected, 
 
78. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 
5; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6; Rotterdam 
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, supra note 
28.  
79. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 34028 U.N.T.S. 1. 
80. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, supra note 12. 
81. See generally Boyle, supra note 65, at 126–27; BLOKKER & SCHERMERS, 
supra note 59, § 1266; BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 67, at 216.   
82. Brunnée, supra note 57, ¶ 1; Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 7–8; Robin 
R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in 
International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623, 628 (2000). 
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requiring holistic approaches that are not easy to achieve.83 Finally, 
human activity that has harmful impacts on the environment is mostly 
caused by industrial and technological developments, requiring costly 
adjustments in production and consumption models and accentuating 
inequalities between developed and developing states.84 These aspects 
make it difficult for states to achieve broad consensus in international 
negotiations and make the field difficult to address through a 
comprehensive set of rules and commitments set out in one (or even a 
few) instruments. Instead, the UNEP register of environmental 
agreements counts 272 agreements adopted between 1920 and 2005.85 
This difficulty is the reason why the field has been regulated, 
mostly, through MEAs—each often addressing only one environmental 
issue and designed as framework conventions.86 The outcome of this 
practice are regimes in which treaties are merely “the tip of the 
normative iceberg” and the majority of norms that detail the 
obligations assumed by states are developed in subsequent protocols or 
through binding and non-binding decisions of the COP.87 As noted, 
amendments to treaty or protocol norms are often adopted by 
consensus or, as a last resort, by a qualified majority vote of the parties 
at a COP or the MOP.88 Moreover, at least in the case of certain 
amendments to the annexes of the Montreal Protocol, there is no 
provided possibility for objecting states to opt out.89 These procedures 
clearly deviate from the rules on treaty amendment provided for in the 
 
83. Katja Biedenkopf, Relations Between International Organisations in 
Combating Climate Change, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF INTER-
ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 649, 650 (Joachim A. 
Koops & Rafael Biermann eds., Palgrave Macmillan U.K. 2017); 
Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 8. 
84. Brunnée, supra note 57, ¶ 1; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34, 40. 
85. See United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Register of 
International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the 
Environment, UNEP/Env.Law/2005/3 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
86. Romanin Jacur, supra note 22, at 420; Loibl, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
87. Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 21; see also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 
4, at 17.  
88. E.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138, at art. XV; 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 11, 
at arts. 8–9; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, supra note 50, at arts. 9–10; Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 
supra note 12, at art. 17; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 
6, at arts. 29–30; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, supra note 5, at arts. 15–16. Cf. Hey, supra note 62, at 756–57. 
89. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra 
note 50, at art. 2 ¶ 9(d). 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which all states 
must agree to an amendment to be bound by it.90 In fact, a marked 
feature of the environmental treaty system is that decisions on new 
standards, or adaptation of existing ones, can be taken within the 
institutional frameworks created by MEAs through simplified 
legislative procedures, instead of requiring states to go back to lengthy 
treaty negotiations.91 
Furthermore, these features of the decision-making procedures of 
the institutional structures of MEAs highlight the limited explanatory 
force of the “treaty analogy,” which attempts to explain the bindingness 
of decisions of international organizations through the combined will of 
all their members who participate in the discussions and consent to be 
bound. More generally, they challenge the strict requirement of state 
consent that characterizes the first formal source of international law 
and set aside the idea that COPs and MOPs are mere treaty bodies 
instead of autonomous institutional structures.92  
3.2. Custom  
The identification of a rule of customary international law requires, 
as established in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, evidence of two 
elements: general practice and opinio iuris.93 To qualify as general 
practice, a practice must be consistent (albeit not uniform),94 extensive 
(albeit not universal),95 and include those states whose interests are 
 
90. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, art. 38. 
91. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
supra note 50, at art. 11 ¶ 4(h)–(j). 
92. Churchill and Ulfstein have produced one of the most in-depth analysis 
of these “autonomous institutional arrangements”, which, they argue, 
possess the three basic elements of the definitions of an international 
organizations ((i) being founded on an international agreement, (ii) 
having at least one organ with a will of its own, and (iii) being established 
under international law). Accordingly, they conclude that the 
institutional arrangements of MEAs should be considered as an 
international organization, albeit of a less formal, more ad hoc nature 
than traditional ones. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 82, at 632–3. 
93. Statute of the I.C.J., Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, art. 38(1)(b) 
[hereinafter Statute of the I.C.J.]; Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on 
Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 
124 (2018). 
94. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27); North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Merits, 
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20). 
95. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶186. 
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specially affected.96 The elapsing of any particular period is not 
essential.97 To give rise to a customary rule, the general practice must 
be undertaken with a sense of legal obligation, i.e., it must be 
accompanied by opinio iuris.98 
Whereas it is the practice of states that is considered most 
determinant in finding the emergence of a new rule of custom (and, for 
that reason, the first element of custom is often referred to as “state 
practice,” even if that is not the wording in the ICJ Statute),99 it has 
gradually been recognized that the practice of international 
organizations can also be relevant, and it is usually taken into 
account.100  
In its recent work on identification of customary international law, 
the ILC explicitly stated that “[i]n certain cases, the practice of 
international organizations also contributes to the formation, or 
expression, of rules of customary international law.”101 The ILC 
specified what the cases are in which the practice of the organizations 
themselves, as separate from the practice of their member states, counts 
towards the requirement of general practice.102 According to this expert 
body, practice can only be relevant in relation to “those rules (a) whose 
subject matter falls within the mandate of the organizations, and/or 
(b) that are addressed specifically to them (such as those on their 
international responsibility or relating to treaties to which international 
organizations may be parties).”103 
Additionally, practices of organizations that have a larger number 
of member states, that are directly carried out on behalf of those 
members or endorsed by them, and are not ultra vires will have greater 
weight in relation to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary 
international law.104 According to these criteria, it is plausible that the 
practice of those institutional structures established by MEAs will be 
particularly relevant in the development of international environmental 
law, particularly since some of them have a broad membership and are 
 
96. Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth, 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 73. 
97. See id. 
98. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary Int’l 
Law, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 138 (2018) [hereinafter 
ILC Draft Conclusions]. 
99. Michael Wood & Sender Omri, State Practice, ¶¶ 1–2 (2017). 
100. E.g., ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 98, at 130; Maurice H. Mendelson, 
The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 ACADÉMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 201–3 (1999). 
101. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 98, at 130. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 131. 
104. Id.  
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granted broad powers to interpret, apply, and even modify the 
agreement. 
As for opinio iuris, while the ILC draft conclusions seem to only 
refer to states in their enumeration of the forms of evidence of this 
element, the commentary makes it clear that the list applies mutatis 
mutandis to the practice of international organizations that can 
evidence acceptance as law.105  
Under these terms, resolutions, decisions, and other instruments of 
international organizations can have an impact on the development of 
customary international law. They can, similarly to the practice of 
states, codify existing rules, start the process for the formation of a new 
rule, or arrest the development of a rule. 106 Additionally, the attitudes 
of member states towards them can reveal state practice and opinio 
iuris of states themselves.107 Accordingly, when in the Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons the ICJ 
recognized that the general obligation of states to ensure the activities 
within their jurisdiction and control do not cause transboundary 
environmental harm was part of customary international law, it referred 
to principles in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations as expressing “the 
common conviction of the States concerned that they have a duty.”108 
However, customary international law remains a limited source of 
norms in the environment field.109 Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey argue 
that customary international law is just not well suited to produce the 
kind of detailed regulation that environmental problems require, due to 
the decentralized and uncoordinated processes through which it 
develops, and, therefore, it can only produce some broad principles.110 
In fact, a general practice with the level of detail and precision required 
 
105. Id. at 141. 
106. See generally id.  
107. BLOKKER & SCHERMERS, supra note 39, §§ 1249–1252; SANDS ET AL., 
supra note 59, at 295–97; JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 591–95 (2005); BOYLE & CHINKIN, 
supra note 67, at 212. 
108. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 27–29 (July 8).  
109. In addition to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, it is argued that 
the equitable and reasonable use of natural resources and certain 
procedural obligations, such as consultation, provision of information, and 
the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment for 
activities likely to cause transboundary harm, have reached the status of 
customary environmental law. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 177, 204 (Apr. 20); ELLEN 
HEY, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 59–62, 79–83 (2016); Redgwell, supra note 63, at 952–53; SANDS, 
supra note 49, at 148.  
110. Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 23.  
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is not easy to find and demonstrating the existence of opinio iuris is no 
small challenge, as it is difficult to access the motives underlying the 
actions of states and other relevant actors. 111 These difficulties add up 
to the long-discussed identity crisis of customary international law, 
related to the emergence of modern approaches that de-emphasize the 
importance of general practice as a requirement of custom.112 As a 
result, this source is unlikely to be a main driver in the development of 
international environmental law. 
3.3. General principles of law 
General principles of law are the final source of international law 
recognized under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.113 A current account of 
this source considers it to encompass two types of general principles: 
general principles of municipal law, which are common to a majority of 
states and which can be transposed to the international legal system, 
and principles of international law, that develop directly in the 
international legal system.114 While the process for the identification of 
general principles is not overtly clear, the key requirement seems to be 
the verification that they enjoy general acceptance by states (also 
referred to as endorsement or recognition).115 General acceptance can 
be derived either from the inclusion of a principle in municipal legal 
 
111. See SANDS, supra note 49, at 144–46 (noting that few instances of 
empirical research have been conducted into state practice relating to 
international environmental obligations); see also DANIEL BODANSKY, 
THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 198 
(2010) (noting the difficulties of obtaining systematic information about 
incidents on the ground even for delegates of the state). 
112. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 
82, 88 (1988–1989); see also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary 
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 118 (2005); Anthea 
Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 757, 757–58 
(2001). This approach finds support in the Nicaragua case, where the ICJ 
delimited the content of the customary rule on the prohibition of the use 
of force essentially from the wording of UN General Assembly resolutions 
rather than the practice of states. Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Reports 14, ¶ 187 (1986).  
113. Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 93, at art. 38(3). 
114. Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on General 
Principles of Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/732, ¶¶ 189–253 (2019); 
THIRLWAY, supra note 65, at 108–9. But see Alain Pellet & Daniel Müller, 
Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 819, 255 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. 3rd ed. 
2019) for an example where 38(1)(c) is not interpreted to include the 
second type of principles.  
115. Simma & Alston, supra note 112, at 102. 
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orders or from its deduction from rules of international law, which 
states have already accepted, and declarations of states directly 
recognizing the principle.116  
It is the second type of general principles that we are referring to 
in the debate on whether certain “principles of international 
environmental law” found in treaty provisions, the declarations of the 
UN Conferences, and other non-binding instruments and widely 
discussed in legal literature can be considered as general principles of 
law.117 The precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle, the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and the 
principle of sustainable development are some of the most frequently 
referenced candidates for recognition under this source of international 
law.118 
The ILC Special Rapporteur on this topic identifies two processes 
for the identification of general principles formed within the 
international legal system—either they are “widely incorporated into 
treaties and other international instruments, such as General Assembly 
resolutions,” or they “underlie general rules of conventional or 
customary international law.”119 According to the Special Rapporteur, 
these are two alternative forms of demonstrating recognition, which 
must be wide, representative, and reflect a common understanding of 
the community of nations to determine the identification of the general 
principle.120 In practice, the identification of a principle of international 
environmental law will most likely require a combination of both 
processes in order to gather enough evidence that it enjoys the 
necessary general acceptance or recognition.  
 
116. Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on 
General Principles of Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/741, ¶ 11 (2020) 
[hereinafter ILC Second Report]; Beatrice I. Bonafé & Paolo Palchetti, 
Relying on General Principles in International Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
MAKING 160, 163–64 (Catherine Brölmann & Yannick Radi eds., 2016). 
See also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 554, ¶ 24 (Dec. 22, 1986).  
117. See generally SANDS, supra note 49 (describing such principles in detail). 
118. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 
I), annex I, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 15, 16 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; 
HEY, supra note 109, at 65–74; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the 
Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 451 (1991); SANDS, supra note 49, 
at 48.  
119. ILC Second Report, supra note 116, ¶¶ 122, 138; see also Bonafé and 
Palchetti, supra note 117, at 162 (discussing the process of deduction 
through which general principles can be inferred from existing 
international conventional and customary rules). 
120. ILC Second Report, supra note 116, ¶ 121. 
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In this context, the various instruments of international 
organizations, even non-binding instruments such as resolutions and 
declarations, are relevant insofar as they recognize certain general 
principles and demonstrate their acceptance by the community of 
states, particularly when these are adopted by a large majority and 
concern the interpretation or development of international law.121 
Accordingly, the argument in favor of the recognition of the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities as a general principle of 
law relies on the express reference in Article 3 of the UNFCCC122 and 
in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration,123 as well as the provisions of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, that establish differentiated 
responsibilities for industrialized and non-industrialized states.124 
Similarly, in favor of the recognition of the polluter pays-principle, it is 
argued that it was embodied in the texts or preamble of several treaties, 
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration, and several recommendations by 
the OECD.125 
 
121. BLOKKER & SCHERMERS, supra note 59, § 1253; BOYLE & CHINKIN, 
supra note 67, at 222–25.  
122. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 
5, at art. 3(1). 
123. Rio Declaration, supra note 118, ¶ 7.  
124. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 44, at arts. 2–3; Paris Agreement to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, 4, Dec. 
12, 2015 T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. 
125. See e.g., Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, art. 3(2), Nov. 7, 
1996; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, art. 2(5)(b), Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 
U.N.T.S. 269 (1992); Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, art. 2(2)(b), Mar. 25, 1992, 2354 
U.N.T.S. 67; International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation, pmbl., May 13,1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 77; 
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, art. 10(d), July 9, 1985; Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, art. 12, Feb. 12, 1978, 1102 U.N.T.S. 
27. See also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD], Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles 
concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, 
¶¶ 2–5, OECD/LEGAL/0102 (May 26, 1972); Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council 
on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, 
OECD/LEGAL/0132 (Nov. 14, 1974); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council on 
the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, 
OECD/LEGAL/0251 (July 7, 1989); Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council on 
the Uses of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy, 
OECD/LEGAL/0258 (Jan. 30, 1991); ILC Second Report, supra note 116, 
¶¶ 135–137.  
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The legal force of the principles of international environmental law, 
however, remains unclear. Many commentators discuss instead their 
emergence as customary international law126 or focus on their role in 
providing frameworks for the legal and diplomatic efforts of states, 
rather than their status as a source of law.127 
3.4. Narrative loopholes and the limitations of the hard law vs. soft law 
dichotomy  
The previous sections have illustrated how soft law instruments 
adopted by international organizations have been incorporated into 
treaty texts or contributed to the emergence of rules of customary 
international law and general principles of law. However, this narrative, 
which relies on the strict dichotomy between hard and soft law, only 
tells us a small part of the story of institutional law-making and cannot 
fully explain the impact these instruments have in the development of 
international environmental law. 
Firstly, this narrative cannot explain the persuasive force of certain 
nonbinding instruments of international organizations with which 
states frequently comply even in the absence of any relation to a formal 
source.128 This is notably the case of numerous standards adopted by 
international organizations that establish thresholds of environmental 
protection (including codes of conduct, guidelines, suggested practices). 
As an example, the FAO International Code of Conduct on the 
Distribution and Use of Pesticides129 and UNEP London Guidelines for 
the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade,130 
which established soft law obligations for states not to export banned 
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127. Dupuy, supra note 118, at 461–62 (referring specifically to sustainable 
development and to the precautionary principle). Dupuy sustains that the 
distinction between custom and general principles is not particularly 
relevant when looking at the processes for the development of 
environmental law, as “both kinds of norms proceed from the same 
progressive sedimentation of general statements, together with more or 
less coherent state practice and sometimes assisted by judicial 
consolidation,” id. 
128. Nigel D. White, Lawmaking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 566 (Jacob Katz Cogan et al. Nov. 
2017); Matthias Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King: 
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chemicals or pesticides without agreement from the importing states, 
were widely accepted and implemented by states already before they 
came to be incorporated in the PIC Convention.131 Similarly, the 
standards of the Codex Alimentarius, dealing with, among others, 
maximum limits on pesticides, were widely applied by states and food 
producers well before a reference to them was incorporated in the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures.132 
In fact, although standard-setting constitutes a significant part of 
the law-making activities of international organizations today, and 
although it has proved to be a persuasive means of guiding state 
conduct in several domains, it is a practice that is difficult to encompass 
within the traditional account of institutional law-making.133 It is telling 
that organizations themselves are at odds with how to deal with these 
instruments. The UN General Assembly, for instance, has taken various 
approaches towards UNEP adopted standards. For example, while it 
merely took note of the UNEP Principles on Shared National Resources 
as “guidelines and recommendations” to be used in formulating 
conventions,134 it promulgated the World Charter for Nature by stating 
that its principles “shall be reflected in the law and practice of each 
State, as well as at the international level.”135 The UNEP Governing 
Council, in turn, asked states and international organizations to “take 
. . . into account” the Montreal Guidelines on Land based Pollution.136 
It is not clear whether these different forms of endorsement had any 
impact on the reception of these instruments by states.  
Secondly, a narrative that relies on the strict requirements of the 
formal sources of international law equally struggles to explain the legal 
character of decisions of COPs and MOPs, which are not treaty law 
but, nevertheless, bind member states.137 The difficulties arise 
particularly in relation to those decisions that modify certain aspects of 
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treaty obligations that a qualified majority can adopt without a chance 
for opposing states to opt out, therefore escaping the formal rules for 
treaty amendment. 
Finally, and more importantly, a narrative that labels most 
instruments of international organizations as soft law is of limited 
utility when what the traditional theory of sources of international law 
can say about this category is little more than it not being formally 
law.138 
A review of recent accounts on institutional law-making 
demonstrates that the problem in contemporary narratives is not the 
lack of realization that the normative output of international 
organizations is expanding in size and variety and growing in 
importance, a widely discussed trend. Instead, the main problem is that 
theory has not been able to catch up with practice and has largely 
remained unchanged since the creation of international organizations. 
The traditional framework of institutional law-making rests on three 
fundamental premises: (1) state consent as the basis of legitimacy of all 
international rules; (2) a strict division between law and non-law; and 
(3) the trilogy of formal sources as the only sources of international 
law.139 This traditional model sees international organizations as little 
more than fora for negotiations between states and is unable to properly 
address the innovative legislative techniques and dynamic law-making 
processes that they have developed.140 In fact, arguments that seek to 
explain the normative authority of international organizations by 
reference to formal law-making processes and a strict division between 
soft and hard law are unsuccessful in filling the gap in the story of 
institutional law-making.141 
In this context, the “soft law” label is used to encompass a great 
number and variety of instruments adopted by international 
organizations, which are adopted through different procedures and 
influence international law in distinct ways.142 In studying the 
normative output of international organizations, one would expect that 
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international lawyers should be able to describe and explain at least 
some of this variety. However, this can only be achieved once we stop 
applying a framework of analysis that, simply put, does not have the 
vocabulary nor the analytical tools to deal with new phenomena that 
did not exist at the time it was created. This position is not novel. In 
1977, Schreuer argued that authors attempting to explain 
recommendations of international organizations within the framework 
of the traditional sources of international law were “tackl[ing] new legal 
phenomena with a set of unsuitable theoretical tools.”143 According to 
Schreuer, explaining the relevance of recommendations by reference to 
any of the sources in Article 38 was “hardly plausible.”144 The UN 
General Assembly itself noted this in Resolution 3232 (XXIX) of 22 
November 1970, where it recognized that, “the development of 
international law may be reflected, inter alia, by declarations and 
resolutions of the General Assembly which may to that extent be taken 
into consideration by the International Court of Justice.”145 
In 1981, Jennings advocated against trying “to force these newer 
trends and techniques into one or other of the compartments of the 
1920 mold.”146 For Jennings, it was pointless to try to categorize, under 
any of the traditional sources, the laws and regulations made by 
international organizations in their specific fields.147 Writing more 
recently, Goldman agreed that the plurality of legal instruments of 
international organizations “stands in marked contrast to the narrow 
limits of the classical doctrine of the sources of international law as 
stipulated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.”148 Furthermore, the 
constitutional ambitions of Article 38 have been long questioned— it is 
hardly clear that the article was intended to do anything else besides 
listing the types of instruments that the ICJ (and the Permanent Court 
of International Justice before it) was to apply and especially that it 
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was intended as an exhaustive list of sources of international law 
norms.149 
Nevertheless, despite the recurrence of the debate, the traditional 
account of law-making by international organizations, originally 
developed over a century ago as the first organizations appeared and 
later strongly relying on the list of sources established in Article 38, has 
lingered until today. 150 It is time international lawyers agree on its 
limitations and find ways to overcome them. 
4. Looking through a different lens 
Moving beyond the deadlock in the study of institutional law-
making requires international lawyers to change their analytical tools 
and develop a new approach for analyzing the instruments of 
international organizations. This requires actively challenging—and, 
potentially, abandoning all together—the premises underlying the 
traditional framework of institutional law-making, creating space to 
test new ones.  
A good place to start is by challenging the strict binary distinction 
that contrasts law with non-law—and the consequent opposition 
between binding and nonbinding instruments of international 
organizations. In several cases, the formally binding or nonbinding 
character of a rule is insufficient to explain its persuasiveness, authority, 
and even compliance by states and other actors, making it clear that 
theory no longer fits practice. The formally nonbinding character of 
certain standards and guidelines on protection of the environment has 
not prevented them from shaping state conduct.151 
However, current studies on law-making by international 
organizations usually depart from the division of instruments into 
binding and nonbinding. Handbooks on the law of international 
organizations typically structure the discussion on the legal instruments 
around four categories: conventions, binding decisions (or 
determinations), nonbinding instruments (also referred to as soft law 
and divided into recommendations and declarations), and internal rules 
governing the functioning of the organizations (binding but without 
external effects).152 This initial labelling of instruments predetermines 
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the result of all subsequent analysis into their law-making 
characteristics—only the first two types of instruments are even 
considered as being potentially law-creating.  
But the problem goes beyond choosing the right moment for 
classification. In fact, it is the very classification into binding and 
nonbinding that is problematic, as it presupposes that international 
normativity is an “all or nothing” variable—either an agreement fulfils 
all the formal criteria, and it is part of binding international law, or it 
is not law and has only political or moral significance.153 The expansion 
of the concept of soft law does not really solve this problem because 
soft law instruments are still generally considered to be non-law, even 
if they are “somehow of relevance to law.”154 They are unable to create 
binding obligations and, to the extent that it is sometimes admitted 
that they can have legal effects, these are normally described in relation 
to the formal sources of international law. 
This ignores that there are instruments of so-called soft law that 
share most characteristics of hard law—such as following a detailed 
procedure for approval, sharing the characteristics of legal rules, 
functioning just like international law norms, and as noted, often 
achieving high levels of compliance.155 The main difference is that, 
generally, the violation of these norms does not entail specific legal 
consequences—namely, it does not give rise to a claim of state 
responsibility and the right to judicial enforcement. While relevant, this 
characteristic does not seem sufficient to exclude these instruments 
from the realm of international normativity—particularly considering 
how this option is also not practically available for so many formal 
international law norms and it is widely agreed not to be a defining 
element of international law.156 Instead, it is one of the characterizing 
elements of these types of norms to be featured in their description 
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within a revised doctrine of normative instruments of international 
organizations. 
Authors that argue for the inclusion of (at least, certain) 
nonbinding instruments within an enlarged concept of international 
legality advocate for one of two strategies—either they propose to revise 
the rule of recognition to reach further than the formal sources doctrine 
and encompass certain soft law instruments, or they sustain that 
different rules of recognition should be identified to recognize different 
levels of normativity.  
Representative of the first type of propositions are the writings of 
Klabbers and Brunnée and Toope. These authors depart from an 
application of Fuller’s eight criteria for the morality of law to propose 
that a revised rule of recognition should be based, not on formalistic 
criteria, but on substantive requirements of legality.157 According to 
Fuller, legal rules must meet eight procedural criteria to be considered 
moral and, as such, to be properly called law, they must be general, 
publicized, prospective rather than retroactive, reasonably clear, not 
contradict each other, not ask for the impossible, remain fairly constant 
over time, and there should be some congruence between declared rules 
and official action.158 These are both a substantive set of criteria for the 
validity of law and a formal criterion for the identification of law; law 
that does not meet the eight requirements, at least to some extent, 
would simply not be law.159 Granted, these authors still support the 
necessity of a formal rule of recognition to delineate the boundary 
between law and non-law.160 However, they sustain that the relevant 
criterium for identification of international legal rules is not their 
inclusion within instruments with certain formal characteristics but the 
possession of certain internal characteristics, which entail their legal 
legitimacy and persuasiveness.161 Such an approach allows for the 
inclusion of nonbinding instruments within the realm of international 
law, as long as they comply with the requirements of legality. Brunnée 
and Toope argue that certain nonbinding rules may even generate more 
fidelity (i.e., attract its own adherence) than certain binding rules.162 
 
157. Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128, at 
361–62 
158. Or they must avoid “eight distinct routes to disaster.” LON L. FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW: REVISED EDITION 39 (1969). See also Brunnée, 
supra note 39, at 26; Jan Klabbers, supra note 148, at 84, 92.  
159. Id. at 107. 
160. Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128, at 
361–63 
161. Id. 
162. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 27–28, 51 (2010). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
The Role of International Organizations in the Development of 
International Environmental Law: Adjusting the Lenses of Analysis 
265 
 
Goldmann, in turn, criticizes this approach for putting all 
instruments on the same footing.163 For Goldmann, the way forward is 
to assume that different grades of legal normativity can exist, a position 
that has been referred to as “relative normativity.” 164 Those different 
levels would permit distinguishing between formal sources of 
international law and other instruments which are not susceptible to 
giving rise to damages or claims before international courts but, 
nonetheless, share characteristics of legal rules.165 Goldmann proposes 
seeing normativity as a continuum, creating the possibility to identify 
different categories of instruments.166 He then argues that each category 
of instruments resembles a self-contained regime, composed of 
instruments that are comparable to such a degree that justifies the 
development and application of one identical legal regime that sets up 
rules regarding competence, procedure, and judicial review.167 Finally, 
he proposes that different rules of recognition should be conceived for 
each category of instruments, which reflect their different 
characteristics and legal effects.168 
A fitting solution is probably found somewhere in the middle. While 
a broad analysis of the output of international organizations will 
certainly reveal a diversity of normative instruments, displaying a 
different number of legal characteristics and producing a diversity of 
legal effects, all of which can be considered law-making, it must still be 
possible for the international lawyer to distinguish normative 
instruments from those that do not meet that qualification.169 That is, 
it should still be possible to formulate a rule of recognition to 
distinguish international law from non-law, even when arguing that the 
concept of law might contain different categories and levels of 
normativity and that such a rule needs to incorporate enough flexibility 
so that it can recognize a diversity of sources that goes well beyond the 
formal sources of Article 38 and that will be different in different fields. 
I argue, however, that the formulation of a revised rule of 
recognition and an all-encompassing theory of law-making by 
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international organizations is the last step of a long walk that 
international lawyers are just starting. As a first step, it is fundamental 
to deepen our understanding of the diverse legal outputs of 
organizations to be able to construct a theory that covers the processes 
taking place in the practice of organizations today. Particularly 
concerning nonbinding instruments, the study of the individual 
characteristics of each type of instrument has been largely absent.  
For the sake of completeness of the analysis, and to advance 
alternative paths for research and theory, I propose that it is necessary 
to conduct research into the normative outputs of international 
organizations while ignoring the strict binary law versus non-law and 
collecting and analyzing the broadest variety of instruments. This is 
particularly relevant for research focusing on law-making by 
international organizations engaged in protection of the environment. 
In few other fields is “law in its infinite variety”170 as visible as it is here, 
notably because of the relative infancy of the field and the unsystematic 
way in which international regimes have emerged.  
Looking into the different outputs of organizations in the 
environmental field that were mentioned throughout this article, one 
comes across a wide variety of instruments: (1) treaties (notably, the 
MARPOL, adopted by the IMO), protocols, annexes, and amendments 
to those; (2) instruments establishing new institutional structures, be 
it new bodies of an organization aimed at dealing directly with certain 
environmental matters (examples include the UNGA resolutions 
establishing UNEP and the CSD) or joint institutional arrangements 
where two or more organizations cooperate (such as the GEF); (3) 
various decisions on implementation of treaty obligations and 
compliance review adopted by COPs; (4) declarations of principles, 
guidelines, and standards aiming to guide action on environmental 
conservation (such as the UNEP Guidelines on Management of 
Hazardous Waste and on Environmental Impact Assessment); and (5) 
draft texts, which guide negotiations and can be adopted by states 
(such as the draft texts of the UNFCCC and the Convention on 
Biodiversity, prepared by the UN).  
All these instruments have legal effects of their own, despite 
differing in how they are created, who they address, how they function, 
and the consequences of non-compliance. Some of them are the final 
output of a legislative process, while others are meant as an 
intermediary step, to be later taken up by other actors; some include 
mandatory language, while others do not; some are addressed to states, 
others also to different actors; some are meant to direct conduct, while 
others to guide future law-making; some are adopted by unanimity, 
other by consensus, others by majority; and not all of them rely on 
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state consent. Little progress can be made in the doctrine by grouping 
a good part of these instruments under the category of soft law and 
analyzing them together.  
Instead, an empirical analysis of the various normative activities of 
international organizations must guide future research. Without the 
constraints of the theory of sources and the strict binding versus 
nonbinding division, it should paint a full picture of their normative 
outputs and analyze their different characteristics, processes for 
adoption, reception by states and other relevant actors, and impact in 
shaping conduct and developing international law. It is only from such 
an analysis that new ways of categorizing this infinite variety of 
instruments can be developed and that international lawyers can start 
developing the analytical tools they so desperately need to advance 
their discussion and fill the gap in the story of institutional law-making. 
5. Conclusion 
The developments in normative processes in international 
environmental law, where international organizations have played a 
central role, have evidenced that the traditional account of institutional 
law-making is increasingly at odds with international law-making 
today. As international organizations are drafting the texts of 
environmental treaties, adopting standards and guidelines that 
effectively (and, sometimes, exclusively) regulate areas of practice, and 
developing and altering treaty obligations (in some cases, dispensing 
with the need for express consent by all state parties), it becomes 
evident that it is not possible to continue explaining institutional law-
making through the three dogmas of state consent, strict division 
between law and non-law, and the trilogy of formal sources. The 
limitations of this traditional framework are evidenced by the fact that 
that all it can say about most normative outputs of international 
organizations is that they are formally not law and, as such, should be 
grouped under the category of soft law, despite their internal diversity 
and that many share the characteristics of binding international law. 
Accordingly, this article argued that international lawyers must 
come to terms with the fact that the traditional framework of 
institutional law-making does not have the vocabulary, nor the 
analytical tools necessary, to deal with new diverse and dynamic law-
making processes led by international organizations that did not exist 
at the time that framework was created.  
To move the debate forward and start closing the gap between the 
practice of international organizations and the theory of institutional 
law-making, it is fundamental that new approaches are developed that 
actively challenge the premises of the traditional framework. To this 
end, this article proposes the abandonment of the strict binary 
opposition between law and non-law—at the very least, for the purpose 
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of analysis. This will permit painting the full picture of normative 
activities of international organizations and exploring the different 
characteristics of their instruments, without an a priori judgement of 
their aptitude to produce legal effects. It is only from such analysis that 
international lawyers can start to develop the new analytical tools they 
need to account for the full story of law-making by international 
organizations in their different fields. 
The crux of the matter is still the decades-old question famously 
asked by Jennings, “what is international law and how do we know it 
when we see it?”171 In the case of the normative instruments of 
international organizations, we need to change our reading lenses if we 
aim to even start seeing, let alone explaining, their variety and their 
contribution for the development of international law.  
 
 
171. Jennings, supra note 146. 
